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
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Pershing's Mission in Mexico

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Final report 6 June 1975



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
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The Punitive Expedition led by Brigadier General John J. Pershing in Mexico from March 1916 to February 1917 in pursuit of Francisco Villa is one of the more obscure campaigns conducted by the United States Army. The changing role of the United States in the world should encourage Americans to reexamine the history which this country shares with Mexico. It is the purpose of this study to identify and examine the significant aspects of the Punitive Expedition and to provide an interpretive guide to the study of that subject.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be gained from the study of the Punitive Expedition concerns General Pershing and the way he responded to the many challenges confronting him. The story of his responsiveness to his civilian leaders appears to offer a model study in proper civil-military relations. The diplomatic considerations which restricted Pershing's freedom of action compounded the problems caused by inaccurate information, inadequate maps, faulty equipment, poor communications, an uncooperative host government and overextended supply lines. In spite of numerous handicaps he maintained a high state of training and esprit within his command while satisfying his civilian and military supervisors. More importantly he kept the United States out of a war with Mexico at a crucial time in the world's history.

PERSHING'S PUNITIVE EXPEDITION: AN OVERVIEW
WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1975

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ABSTRACT

The Punitive Expedition led by Brigadier General John J. Pershing in Mexico from March 1916 to February 1917 in pursuit of Francisco Villa is one of the more obscure campaigns conducted by the United States Army. The changing role of the United States in the world should encourage Americans to reexamine the history which this country shares with Mexico. It is the purpose of this study to identify and examine the significant aspects of the Punitive Expedition and to provide an interpretive guide to the study of that subject.

Most of the sources used were published in the United States although a few are English translations of Mexican works. Also some Mexican materials which have not been translated were used. Few detailed accounts of the Punitive Expedition have been written but a wealth of information was found in general periodicals and professional magazines of the period as well as in memoirs, novels, history books, War Department records and other government documents.

Private, moneyed interests appear to have had great influence upon politicians, advisers and decisionmakers involved in Mexican-American relations during this period. American policymakers lacked sympathetic insight into Mexico's problems. President Wilson's ignorance of the Mexican psyche

may have prevented him from ever understanding the almost universal rejection by Mexicans of any sort of American intervention in Mexico.

Many of the lessons learned from the experiences of Pershing and his men were ignored by Americans preparing to engage in activities of a similar nature in Vietnam fifty years later. The enemy in Mexico was an equally elusive one operating with the support of local partisans. The failure of America's political and military leaders to understand the realities of Mexico's internal situation did much to create then exacerbate a situation which could have brought the two countries to war.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be gained from the study of the Punitive Expedition concerns General Pershing and the way he responded to the many challenges confronting him. The story of his responsiveness to his civilian leaders appears to offer a model study in proper civil-military relations. The diplomatic considerations which restricted Pershing's freedom of action compounded the problems caused by inaccurate information, inadequate maps, faulty equipment, poor communications, an uncooperative host government and overextended supply lines. In spite of numerous handicaps he maintained a high state of training and esprit within his command while satisfying his civilian and military superiors. More importantly he kept the United States out of a war with Mexico at a crucial time in the world's history.

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CHAPTER I

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The Punitive Expedition led by Brigadier General John J. Pershing in Mexico from March 1916 to February 1917 is one of the least understood and most neglected military campaigns of the American Army. The reasons for this, I believe, are many. Although a few sensational events occurred, it was not the kind of military action that holds a nation's interest. Besides, there was an important war going on in Europe. It was not a successful operation in a purely military sense although General Pershing was praised upon its termination and some noteworthy things were accomplished. Furthermore, America's entry into the Great War soon required the efforts and attentions of her people. In a few months the Punitive Expedition was all but forgotten. Since then greater issues have attracted serious scholars and relatively little has been done to give the Punitive Expedition its proper place in American military history. Hidden within the pages of sometimes dull and often inaccurate official reports and romanticized memoirs lies a story which deserves close examination. It is my purpose in writing this paper to identify the significant aspects of the Expedition and to provide an interpretive guide to further study of this subject.

During the Punitive Expedition the American Army employed horse-mounted cavalry on a large scale for the last time on this continent. Also the use of motorized forces and aviation to support American troops on foreign soil was introduced. As a result of the experiences of Pershing's men, Americans were far better prepared to use and maintain those two important instruments of modern warfare in Europe when the time came.

There are other reasons why this operation deserves the attention of the professional soldier. The story of Pershing's responsiveness to his civilian leaders in Washington appears to offer a model study in proper civil-military relations. Such may or may not be the case as this study will demonstrate. The diplomatic considerations which restricted Pershing's freedom of action compounded the problems posed by such factors as inaccurate information, inadequate maps, faulty equipment, poor communications, an uncooperative host government and overextended supply lines. Prior to and throughout the conduct of the campaign, many of America's political and military leaders seemed not to understand or chose to ignore the realities of the internal political situation of Mexico.

My personal interest in this subject is a result of my conviction that Americans should know more about the history that their country shares with Mexico. America's relationship with Mexico is likely to undergo some

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significant changes in the future. An understanding of the past may facilitate the future cooperation between our two societies. Furthermore, Mexico is the birthplace of many Americans and holds a special place in the hearts of thousand of Americans of Mexican ancestry.

There were no setpiece battles fought during the campaign. The enemy was an elusive one. The lessons learned by Pershing and his men were ignored by Americans preparing to fight an amazingly similar war in Vietnam fifty years later. There is also a likelihood that limited force operations will be conducted by the United States Army in the future. General Pershing's experience in Mexico offers some worthwhile lessons on that subject.

In Chapter II I will briefly relate the highlights of the Punitive Expedition from the time just prior to President Wilson's decision to send American forces into Mexico to capture Pancho Villa until his decision to withdraw Pershing's forces eleven months later. In Chapter III I will explain both my research methodology and the organization of the interpretive guide to further study which is contained in Chapter IV. In Chapter V I will briefly summarize the material presented and will offer some conclusions.

CHAPTER II

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EXPEDITION

RECOGNITION OF CARRANZA

The fall of the government of Mexican President Francisco I Madero at the hands of General Victoriano Huerta in 1913 signaled the beginning of one of the most difficult and tragic periods in Mexico's history. Huerta's coup d'etat followed by the murder of Madero among other things prompted American President Woodrow Wilson to withhold recognition of Huerta's government. Later, President Wilson used the influence of his office and at times military force to show his dissatisfaction with Huerta in an obvious attempt to influence Mexico's internal situation.¹ In this endeavor Wilson was successful. On 20 August 1914 Huerta surrendered to the combined pressures of his chief rivals for power, Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa aided by Emiliano Zapata.²

Mexico's problems were far from over however. For over a year war raged throughout Mexico as opposing revolutionary armies struggled for control of the country. President Wilson was painstakingly cautious in deciding which leader to support and his government had diplomatic intercourse with both Carranza and Villa. At the suggestion of

Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Wilson called for a conference with the five ranking Latin American envoys in Washington to help him decide which faction to back as the de facto government of Mexico.³ Formal recognition of the Carranza Government as the de facto government was made on October 19, 1913.

Thereafter, the United States professed its neutrality but was distinctly more kind toward Carranza than it was toward Villa. On the day of the formal recognition President Wilson reimposed an embargo upon arms and munitions for Villa while he allowed the export of weapons to Carranza.⁴ Villa felt betrayed and was angered by Wilson's action. He also began suffering heavy losses, many at the hands of Carranza's leading general, Alvaro Obregon. However, he was more intent than ever upon destroying Carranza's forces. He carefully planned the capture of Agua Prieta, the only vestige of Carranza's authority in northern Sonora. He would have probably succeeded had not President Wilson approved a request from the de facto government to reinforce its garrison by transporting trainloads of soldiers, artillery, munitions and other equipment through New Mexico and Arizona to Agua Prieta. As a result of this action the defenders made their position almost impregnable and when Villa attacked his army was soundly defeated.⁵

President Wilson had chosen to support the Mexican faction which seemed to offer the most immediate promise for

peace and stability in Mexico. Events in Europe demanded an increasing amount of the President's time. He had hoped that by tipping the balance in Mexico in favor of Carranza he could help resolve the Mexican matter which was also becoming a political irritant due to Republican pressure. He could then turn his attention to other things. However Francisco Villa, the Lion of the North, was intent upon providing President Wilson with anything but peace.

VILLA'S REVENGE

After his defeat at Agua Prieta, Villa reorganized his forces and began a campaign of harassment of Americans and Carrancistas. He was determined to provoke intervention in Mexico. Villa well knew the feelings of his countrymen toward Yankee intervention. By leading the fight against gringo invaders Villa could regain both the hero's mantle and the power which he had recently lost. In January 1916 General Pershing then stationed at Fort Bliss reported information concerning Villa's plan to provoke intervention. He also reported that Americans returning from Mexico voiced little confidence in the ability of the Carranza government to provide stability in Mexico.⁶

On 10 January, Villa committed the first major act of his campaign. Sixteen American mining engineers were killed near Santa Ysabel, about twenty-five miles southwest of Chihuahua. They had been invited by Carranza's government

to reopen American mines in that region. The train on which they were traveling accompanied by twenty Mexican mining employees was stopped and the passengers robbed by a gang of armed men led by Pablo Lopez, a Villista colonel. After robbing the passengers, the bandits ordered the Americans off the train whereupon they were systematically murdered and stripped of their clothing. Through a survivor's account the American people learned of the massacre. The immediate popular reaction in the United States was one of indignation and horror but there was no widespread demand for intervention. An embarrassed Carranza promised to apprehend those responsible but he did not have the resources to do so promptly. Meanwhile, President Wilson's political enemies seized upon the opportunity to insult him. Former President Theodore Roosevelt issued a statement which among other things said,

This dreadful outrage is merely an inevitable outcome of the policies which have been followed in Mexico for the past five years, and, above all, for the last three years. The policy of watchful waiting, the policy of not interfering with "blood spilling," the policy of asking the South and Central American republics to take from us the responsibility that we were too timid to take has borne its legitimate results When the great war ceases we shall have earned the contemptuous dislike of every combatant, and if we don't do our duty in Mexico one or all of them will surely seize Mexico themselves.⁷

Other political leaders made public outcries for immediate armed intervention. Senator Albert Fall of New Mexico was the most boisterous of such advocates. However,

there was still no real enthusiasm on the part of the American people for military adventurism in Mexico and public interest in the matter faded quickly.

Tension continued to mount along the border as Carrancista forces pursued and scattered Villista bands in Chihuahua and American forces on border duty regularly patrolled the border and maintained garrisons at critical points. For control purposes the United States divided the border into ten districts. The headquarters of one such district was located at Columbus, New Mexico, under the command of Colonel Herbert J. Slocum. With a force of 21 officers and 532 enlisted men Colonel Slocum protected a stretch of border sixty-five miles long. Aware of rumors that Villa was planning an attack somewhere within his zone Colonel Slocum took precautions to strengthen his position.⁸

On 9 March 1916 a Villista band of 500-1,000 mounted soldiers crossed the border into Columbus and shot up the town, burning buildings and killing soldiers and civilians. The reaction of Slocum's men was prompt and effective and within a matter of minutes the attackers were driven from the town. Behind them lay eight American soldiers killed and five wounded; eight civilians killed and three wounded. The raiders suffered heavy losses, perhaps 190 killed, in the raid and the brief pursuit into Mexico which followed immediately.⁹ America was stunned. With nonpartisan agreement the American press and public demanded that the

to reopen American mines in that region. The train on which they were traveling accompanied by twenty Mexican mining employees was stopped and the passengers robbed by a gang of armed men led by Pablo Lopez, a Villista colonel. After robbing the passengers, the bandits ordered the Americans off the train whereupon they were systematically murdered and stripped of their clothing. Through a survivor's account the American people learned of the massacre. The immediate popular reaction in the United States was one of indignation and horror but there was no widespread demand for intervention. An embarrassed Carranza promised to apprehend those responsible but he did not have the resources to do so promptly. Meanwhile, President Wilson's political enemies seized upon the opportunity to insult him. Former President Theodore Roosevelt issued a statement which among other things said,

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Mexicans be punished.

Both President Wilson and Carranza were in unenviable positions. For Carranza to accept or welcome the intervention of American forces in Mexico could spell disgrace and political ruin for him. Wilson resisted the clamor for war with Mexico and avoided a full scale invasion at a time when such a move could have helped his 1916 campaign for reelection.¹⁰ He did, however, authorize the War Department to take planning action. On 10 March 1916 the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, who had taken office on the day of Villa's raid, authorized an expedition. His statement, in part, read:

The President has directed that an armed force be sent into Mexico with the sole object of capturing Villa and preventing further raids by his band, and with scrupulous regard for the sovereignty of Mexico.¹¹

Meanwhile representatives of the two governments tried to reach an acceptable agreement on the matter. To Wilson's immediate request for permission to send troops in pursuit of Villa, Carranza, through his Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Acuna, responded with the suggestion that an old agreement between the countries that afforded either nation the right to pursue bandits into the other's territory be reinstated. Mr. Acuna's statement made it clear that his president was suggesting an agreement that would not be retroactive. Such crossings would be permitted "if the raid effected at Columbus should unfortunately be repeated at any other point

on the border."¹² Later, when Carranza was made aware of President Wilson's order to send troops to Mexico he warned that such an action taken without his expressed consent and in the absence of a reciprocal agreement between the two countries would be considered an invasion of national territory regardless of the pretext used to justify the action. The war which would result between the two countries:

. . . would be the most unjust which modern history would record and it would also be an evident proof of the lack of sincerity of the American government, in whose capital the Pan American Conference has just been held and before which President Wilson and his Secretary of State expressed sentiments of fraternity among all nations of the American continent.¹³

At the same time, Carranza warned the Mexican people of a possible war with the United States and told them of his repudiation of Washington's attempt to force upon him a fait accompli.

I am sure I am voicing the national sentiment and that the Mexican people will worthily perform their duty, no matter what sacrifices they may have to undergo in the defense of their rights and sovereignty.¹⁴

Because of Mexico's internal problems, Carranza could not afford to give the appearance of being too cooperative with the President of the Coloso del Norte. Likewise, President Wilson was under considerable pressure from both Congress and the private sector to take bold action. Although no agreement was reached between the two governments it appears that the membership of both houses of Congress did not understand that point. A Senate resolution of



17 March 1916 to which the House of Representatives concurred reads, in part: "Whereas the President has obtained the consent of the de facto government of Mexico for this punitive expedition . . ."¹⁵ The resolution continued, stating that,

The Congress, in approving the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for the purpose announced, joins with the President in declaring that such military expedition shall not be permitted to encroach in any degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico or to interfere in any manner with the domestic affairs of the Mexican people.¹⁶

No doubt those assurances were of little consolation to President Carranza.

The War Department sent a message to General Pershing to the effect that his mission had the approval of the de facto Mexican government. At the same time Pershing received this information he was notified that the commander of the de facto government forces stationed at Palomas, six miles south of Columbus, would oppose the crossing of American troops into Mexico.¹⁷ This dilemma was a portent of the many problems that would frustrate Pershing in the months ahead. However, he had his orders. In spite of remonstrations on the part of Mexicans at many levels from the office of the President to lonely outposts, the wheels of war had begun to roll and there would be no stopping them for several months.

THE EXPEDITION GETS UNDERWAY

A detailed account of the activities and tribulations of the Punitive Expedition is beyond the scope of this

investigation. However, some events should be considered to clarify the situation and to facilitate further investigation. On 14 March 1916 General Pershing issued his General Orders, No. 1, organizing the Punitive Expedition and specifying the provisional division with two provisional cavalry brigades. On orders from Major General Frederick Funston, Commanding General of the Southern Department, Pershing planned to enter Mexico in two columns. He hoped to catch Villa, who was reported to be near Casas Grandes, in a pincer movement. Accordingly, the force was organized into a western column which would enter Mexico by way of Culberson's Ranch and an eastern column which would travel directly south from Columbus. The provisional organization was as follows:

EASTERN COLUMN

13th Cavalry (less one troop)
16th Infantry Regiment
6th Infantry Regiment
Battery C, 6th Field
Artillery
1st Aero Squadron (8 aeroplanes)
1st Battalion, 4th Field
Artillery

WESTERN COLUMN

7th Cavalry
10th Cavalry
Battery B, 6th Field
Artillery¹⁸

The Expedition, initially consisting of about 5,000 men, began its movement into Mexico on the morning of 15 March 1916 and by 20 March both columns reached Colonia Dublan, the site of a Mormon settlement, without incident.

The troops at Palomas deserted the town prior to Pershing's arrival. A short distance from Colonia Dublan the force established a camp to serve as a base for future operations. General Pershing wasted no time in dispatching three squadron-size cavalry detachments to seek out Villa. The ever elusive Villa was reportedly at Namiquipa but by the time the Americans reached the area he had disappeared. Such would be the pattern of operations for the next two months of the campaign. The American troops were poorly dressed and equipped for the bitter cold nights on the high Mexican plateau. Supplies were often scarce and until about mid-April the troops had to live off the land.¹⁹

A more serious problem was that of information. It was soon clear that the presence of thousands of gringos seemingly moving deeper into Mexico caused resentment and suspicion on the part of most Mexicans. It did not help matters that Pancho Villa was a local hero in the state of Chihuahua where the operation was being conducted. Pershing soon concluded that it would be almost impossible to get information of Villa's whereabouts from the local people and he held little hope for cooperation from the troops of the de facto government. In a telegram to the Southern Department sent early in the operation Pershing indicated that "if the campaign were eventually successful it would be without the assistance of any natives south of the border."²⁰

He relied on Mormons from Colonia Dublan and a platoon of Apache scouts for reconnaissance and tracking and when needed they served as interpreters for his forces. The problems posed by the loyalty of the people to Villa and their feelings toward the invaders were never overcome.

There were some reasons for optimism. On 29 March in a short battle at Guerrero, American troops managed to kill 20 Villistas although Villa departed the scene several hours before the surprise attack. He was wounded a few days earlier in a battle with Carranacista forces and had to be physically carried around by his men. After the brief encounter with American troops the Villista force of about 230 men scattered in small bands and disappeared into the mountains.²¹

The relationship existing between the American's and de facto forces was unusual. Despite Carranza's protestation against the presence of American troops in his country they continued to pour in. He was in no position to declare war against the United States and he no doubt hoped that Villa would be captured. A tacit acceptance of the American forces in Mexico was his only alternative for the time being.

Some of the leaders of the de facto government forces were more cooperative and trusting than others. While operating southwest of the city of Chihuahua near the town of San Francisco de Borja, Major Frank Tompkins, commander

of two troop force of the 1st Cavalry, received the following note from General Jose Cavazos, the local Carrancista commander:

On the third of April I telegraphed you, advising you that I thought it prudent to suspend the advance of your troops until we both receive orders on this subject from the citizen Military Commander of the State. As I have just received knowledge that your forces are advancing in accordance with the itinerary which I have, with those under my orders, I would esteem it very much if you would suspend your advance until you receive the order to which I refer, by which means there can be avoided a conflict which may occur by reason of your advance. As I do not doubt that you are aware of the reasons which move me to write this, I hope that we can arrive at an agreement, for which I sign myself. Your attentive and true servant, General Jose Cavazos.²²

Major Tompkins thought that Cavazos was trying to obstruct his movement. Cavazos may have been merely exercising his prerogative as the commander of his district.

Although Major Tompkins' encounter with General Cavazos ended without incident, two similar confrontations had less fortunate outcomes and brought the United States and Mexico dangerously close to all-out war. Despite orders not to occupy Mexican towns, on 12 April, Major Tompkins brought his 100 man cavalry detachment into the southern Chihuahua town of Parral to purchase supplies. In Parral there was a sizeable Carrancista garrison and the people were decidedly pro-Villista. Tompkin's force was suddenly crowded and taunted by a civilian mob. Shots were fired and a riot ensued with Carrancista and pro-Villa Mexicans

fighting the Americans. The Carrancistas at first tried to restrain the mob but later joined it and drove the gringos back to their reinforcements. When the shooting stopped, 40 Mexicans lay dead and two Americans had been killed.²³ Carranza and Wilson faced a crisis situation. Carranza again ordered the Americans to leave Mexico while Wilson's advisers suggested that a withdrawal would cause great political harm to Wilson. It could also, they argued, be interpreted by the Germans as a sign of weakness. In response to Carranza's demand Wilson proposed a conference. Rumors of war abounded and the Secretary of State advised American consuls in Mexico to alert American citizens in their districts to be ready to leave at a moments notice.²⁴

On 28 April, General Hugh L. Scott and Funston met with Carranza's Secretary of War, General Alvaro Obregon. Obregon repeated Carranza's demand that Pershing's forces be removed immediately. General Scott argued the need for Pershing to remain in Mexico to protect American citizens and property.²⁵ Eventually a secret agreement was reached which called for a gradual withdrawal of American forces. This plan was immediately rejected by Carranza and the conference ended.

At home American military leaders advocated increased readiness for war. The President called up the National Guards of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona for border duty and Senator Fall voiced a demand for the complete occupation of

Mexico.²⁶ The situation worsened as a result of another clash between American and Carrancista forces. On 21 June 1916 at Carrizal, 75 American troopers of the 10th Cavalry on a reconnaissance mission were attacked by Carranza's forces as the Americans entered the town in skirmish line.²⁷ Nine American soldiers were killed including two officers; twenty-four were captured and five reported missing. Several inaccuracies appear in General Pershing's reports of the action including his charge that the Americans were attacked, "At the moment of dismounting . . .,"²⁸ prior to entering the town. In light of the facts known by Pershing at the time of his report of the Carrizal incident it is curious that he would heap the entire blame for what happened upon the Mexican de facto government forces.

General Pershing was directed to begin preparations to assume the offensive and he immediately concentrated his forces to secure his lines of communication.²⁹ Meanwhile plans were prepared in Washington for a large scale invasion of Mexico.³⁰ Neither Wilson nor Carranza wanted war. Early in July of 1916 a joint American-Mexican commission was established to settle the Mexican question. Once again, due to domestic political considerations in both countries the negotiations were drawn out. Meanwhile Pershing was ordered to restrict his activity and he withdrew his forces to Colonia Dublan. His troops stayed busy with training and recreational activity. The negotiations continued.

Wilson decided that the European situation was becoming too critical and Carranza by then had strengthened his political position in Mexico somewhat. It was time to settle the matter.

END OF A CHAPTER

On 18 January 1917 General Funston was directed to order General Pershing to plan a withdrawal to the United States. On 5 February 1917 Pershing telegraphed from Columbus, "Expeditionary forces returning from Mexico crossed line today, last troops leaving Mexico at 3 PM."³¹

The Punitive Expedition has been considered by some an humiliating defeat for America. Others say that it created, then perpetuated, the threat of an unnecessary war with Mexico that the United States could not afford to risk, in light of the world situation at the time. It was expensive. The Expedition was in Mexico for slightly less than eleven months at an estimated cost to the United States of over one hundred and thirty million dollars.³² Still others argue that Pershing's mission was successful not only because of the security it provided our border and the lesson it taught the Mexicans but also because of the training and preparation it gave to our armed forces and to the industrial base that supported them. There is some merit to each of these contentions and a balanced appraisal to the Expedition has perhaps never been made.

In this chapter I have presented only the highlights of the operation. A careful and thorough examination of all available material concerning it is necessary before a fair evaluation can be made. Certain questions need to be addressed and some unclear issues illuminated.

ENDNOTES

¹Robert Quirk, An Affair of Honor (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962). In this book which deals with the occupation of Vera Cruz, Quirk discusses Wilson's Mexican policy during this period in detail.

²Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 162.

³Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 192.

⁴Ibid., p. 193.

⁵Ibid.

⁶James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York: MacMillian Company, 1932), p. 561.

⁷"The Mexican Murders," Literary Digest, LII (January 22, 1916), 159.

⁸Robert S. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, "The Mexican Punitive Expedition under Brigadier General John J. Pershing, United States Army, 1916-1917." Chapters I thru V (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. I-13 and I-14.

⁹Colonel Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1934), p. 47.

¹⁰Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 562.

¹¹Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 220.

¹²Paners Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1916 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 485.

¹³Ibid., p. 486.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 487.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 491.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 491-492.

¹⁷Tompkins, op. cit., p. 71.

¹⁸Pershing, "Report," op. cit., pp. 5-6.

¹⁹Thomas and Allen, op. cit., p. III-25.

²⁰Ibid., p. III-27.

²¹Ibid.

²²Tompkins, op. cit., p. 200.

²³Cline, op. cit., p. 180.

²⁴Thomas and Allen, op. cit., p. IV-15.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

As previously stated, a detailed study of Pershing's entire campaign is beyond the scope of this work. Rather, I have prepared an interpretive guide to the literature dealing with the subject and have identified some significant issues that seem important to a fuller understanding of this period. This study should serve as a valuable guide to a more detailed investigation of the subject. In preparing this survey I have concentrated on materials published in the United States although I have made use of foreign sources to a limited extent. Because of space and resource limitations the study emphasizes those works which offer new material or interpretations although reference will be made to general works on the subject.

A significant assumption I made in undertaking this effort is that despite the absence of any balanced, comprehensive work dealing with the Punitive Expedition, sufficient information is available to make such a survey worthwhile. I have made use of history books, general periodicals, professional magazines, memoirs, novels, War Department records, The Congressional Record and other government documents, all of which are reasonably accessible.

I have divided the survey into four parts. In the first part I will examine materials concerning United States-Mexican relations during the period 1910 to 1915. During that time the Mexican Revolution began and some major changes in America's policy toward Mexico were made. I will emphasize works which explain the influence that activities of that period and upon our later involvement in Mexico. The second part will deal with the immediate origins of the Punitive Expedition to include a discussion of works that explain how the decisionmaking process of the Wilson administration functioned during the crisis period. Part three will focus on materials concerning the actual conduct of operations by the Expedition. I will shed some light on the influence that key personalities and decisions had upon the operations. In the final part I will review sources which discuss the aftermath of the Expedition, its impact upon the army and upon our relations with Mexico as well as implications for the future.

CHAPTER IV

AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO FURTHER STUDY

UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS 1910-1915

The early part of the twentieth century was a difficult and complex period of United States-Mexican relations. The opinions of scholars vary greatly as to the wisdom and effectiveness of the policies of Presidents Taft and Wilson with regard to our southern neighbor. In his The United States and Mexico, Howard F. Cline presents a balanced and objective account of this period. He devotes nearly one-third of the book, which is considered one of the premier works on the subject, to a careful and clear presentation of significant trends and events. Although Mr. Cline's criticisms are even handed and well documented, he does not hesitate to share his judgments with the reader. The book also contains an excellent annotated bibliography.

Professor James Morton Callahan's, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations presents a general historical view of American-Mexican policy from Jeffersonian times to the early 1930's. In Chapter XIV, "Wilson's Policy Toward Mexico in Revolution," he addresses the key issues and principal actors of that time. The author makes few attempts

of analysis. This may be accounted for by Callahan's comparative unfamiliarity with the Mexican side of the controversies. He bases his work almost exclusively upon American governmental documents and in so doing he presents the conflicting American views on important issues. Mr. Callahan observes that American policymakers lacked sympathetic insight and assumed an impatient attitude during this critical time when Mexico was struggling to find herself as a nation. He explains the genesis of powerful American economic interests developed during the years of Porfirio Diaz's rule and discusses the activities of certain American magnates who demanded intervention throughout the period.¹ He then examines Wilson's problems in dealing with the Huerta government and the subsequent matter of the recognition of Carranza's de facto government.

A concise study of American-Mexican relations after the Revolution can be found in J. Fred Rippy's essay, "The United States and Mexico" which appears in Mexico, American Policies Abroad. Mr. Rippy discusses the handling of Mexican policy by Taft and Wilson. Taft is described as a "complaisant jurist and moderate imperialist, observing only the political, legal and national aspects of the problem."² His policies as Rippy concludes helped create and exacerbate Mexico's civil disorder.³ Rippy then examines Wilson's moral intervention, his hasty recognition of Carranza, (a result of Wilson's impatience and ignorance of Mexican history), and

his manipulation of arms and munitions exports in favor of Carranza. This essay also provides an account of the political pressures which Wilson confronted regarding Mexico. In addition to his own feelings, Wilson had to consider the war spirit which began developing and the movements for peace and moderation led by Rabbi Stephen Samuel Wise and other religious and educational leaders.

Greatly influencing Wilson's judgment on questions concerning Mexico were the reports of his various special agents operating there. His most important special agent is treated sympathetically in George M. Stephenson's, John Lind of Minnesota. Many American and Mexican writers are highly critical of Lind's mission to Mexico which began during the Huerta period. Stephenson argues that Lind kept Wilson well informed. He also claims that Robert Lansing, Wilson's Secretary of State, used the influence of his office to secure recognition for Carranza. Lansing it seems had some private dealing with supporters of Huerta in Washington in 1914 which he did not want revealed. A more detailed account of the activities of all of the important agents is contained in Emissaries to a Revolution, Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico, by Larry D. Hill.

One can hardly divorce the subject of United States-Mexican relations from other important issue of that period generated by events in Europe. In his Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Ray Stannard Baker, an eminent authority on the

President and a member of the so-called muckraker group, explains the controversy caused by one such issue, the question of national preparedness. The President is described as a man who, harried constantly by individuals and groups representing either strong preparedness or pacifist views, neither yielded to mob hysteria nor heeded the shrill screams of the jingoes.⁴ Mr. Baker succeeds in placing the Mexican problem in perspective.

IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

Some of America's problems with Mexico during this period were related to the resentment and fear that resulted from the 1845-1847 war. Others had more immediate social, political or economic sources. While Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico was the principal justification given for the decision to send the Punitive Expedition into Mexico other options were open to President Wilson. He could choose either of two extremely different courses of action or a course somewhere between the two. One alternative was to do nothing at all about Villa. At the other extreme the President could use the Columbus raid as an excuse for the full scale invasion of Mexico. Between these courses lay the choice of making some action direct enough to avenge the Columbus raid but not so severe as to cause either the collapse of Carranza's government or all-out war. An understanding of the situation along the border in 1916 and of the way in

which President Wilson treated the Mexican question may help to explain why he reacted to the crisis the way he did.

American historians have failed to evaluate the importance of leading Mexican personalities to American policy. Thus, Francisco Villa remains merely a colorful and romantic figure to some, a ruthless bandit-murderer to others and to still others somewhat of a buffoon as portrayed by Wallace Berry in his 30's movie Viva Villa. The United States and Pancho Villa by Clarence C. Clendenen is one of the most scholarly works on Villa written to date. Villa is shown to be a revolutionary leader whose actions and policies often affected the American people. He had a special relationship with his friend General Hugh L. Scott which caused him to be favored. Clendenen describes Villa's reaction to Wilson's decision to recognize Carranza's government. Of great importance to events of this time were the actions of some minor characters discussed in detail by Clendenen.⁵ Both the Santa Ysabel massacre and the raid on Columbus are explained in a thorough and unimpassioned manner.

A comprehensive treatment of the military aspects of the border situation can be found in Colonel Frank Tompkins' Chasing Villa. As a major, Tompkins led the pursuit of Villa's fleeing band after the Columbus raid and he served with the 13th Cavalry throughout the stay of the Punitive Expedition in Mexico. Although published nearly twenty years after the Expedition ended, Colonel Tompkins' descriptions of

operations both along the border and in Mexico are rich with minute detail and interesting anecdotes.

Robert S. Thomas and Inez V. Allen working under the auspices of the U.S. Army Center of Military History prepared an unpublished monograph entitled The Mexican Punitive Expedition. It provides a useful review of the basic issues and an overview of the reaction of the Army and the government to the border problem. Though shallow and at times inaccurate this is probably the most efficient guide to the Punitive Expedition ever written.

The difficulty of protecting the border in 1915-1916 and the monotony of border duty are two of the themes developed by Martin Blumenson in Volume I of The Patton Papers. In the chapter "Fort Bliss and the Border" Mr. Blumenson reveals many interesting facets of the border situation making use of Lieutenant George Patton's diary and his colorful letters to his wife and father. Patton in those days had little respect for the condition of the Mexican troops. His depreciative attitude toward the Mexicans seems to have been shared by many of the officers and men on the border.⁶

An unpublished masters thesis written by Samuel S. Fain titled "The Pershing Punitive Expedition and Its Diplomatic Background" offers some important contributions to the study of the origins of the campaign. Mr. Fain made particularly good use of periodicals in compiling his study. The increased activity of individuals and groups advocating war

with Mexico in March of 1916 is the focal point of the second chapter of his thesis.⁷ Fain also discusses the activities of the American writer, Lincoln Steffens, a muckraker who campaigned against the influence that capitalists from the United States were wielding in Mexican-American relations.

Mr. Steffens in his The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens discusses his experiences as an observer of Carranza's government during this period. He accompanied Carranza on many of his trips about Mexico during the period November 1915 through March 1916 and his interpretations of Carranza's actions and motivations are invaluable. The sympathies of Mr. Steffens are not so much with Carranza, whom he trusted as an honest man and a liberal, but they are clearly against an unwarranted war or an invasion of Mexico.

A different view of Carranza is offered by Francisco Bulnes in The Whole Truth About Mexico. Bulnes was an advisor to Porfirio Diaz and a disciple of positivism. In his criticism of President Wilson's recognition of Carranza's de facto government Bulnes makes a convincing comparison of Jefferson Davis and Francisco Villa. He is certain that Villa's raid on Columbus was not the act of a bandit but rather a carefully planned expression of vengeance against Wilson and Carranza. His explanation of the dynamics of Mexico's internal struggle is excellent but too profound and difficult for most American readers to follow.

As 1916 began troubles with Mexico posed more immediate problems than any of the issues concerning Wilson's administration. A considerable amount of material is available which explains why President Wilson reacted to Mexican matters in the manner in which he did. Two points are important. The first is the influence that the President's psyche had on his Mexican policy and the second is his use of advisers. A related question is the extent to which external pressures, both public and private, may have affected Wilson and his advisers.

In his previously cited Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Ray Stannard Baker asserts that throughout the crucial period prior to the Columbus raid Wilson was almost the sole champion in Washington of Mexico's right to self-determination.⁸ Lacking confidence in Bryan and the Department of State the President was even more distrustful of the jingoistic Americans at home and in Mexico. He went so far as to prepare a list of American Plotters and Liars in Mexico saying, "that the greatest trouble was not with Mexico but with people here in America who wanted the oil and metals in Mexico and were seeking intervention in order to get it."⁹

A colorful exposition of the views of an intelligent and liberal Mexican citizen Jose Vasconcelos can be found in Mexico, American Policies Abroad. Vasconcelos has served as Mexico's Minister of Education and is the author of many books. He was considered a leading exponent of Latin American

culture. Vasconcelos criticizes Wilson's meddling in Mexican affairs. He criticizes Wilson's recognition of Carranza's government not because of his choice but because he elected to choose.¹⁰ Wilson should have refused to recognize any government based on military force. This in the opinion of Vasconcelos would have helped the Mexicans to bring about an agreement for the elimination of rival chieftains.¹¹

David F. Houston, President Wilson's Secretary of Agriculture, makes an appraisal of Wilson handling of Mexico's civil struggle in his Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920. Houston stresses the President's good intentions in his Mexican policy. However the President, according to Houston, was an intellectual thoroughbred who had a one track mind and often failed to see the implications of his statements and actions.

In Woodrow Wilson: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies, Arthur S. Link, a leading authority on Wilson, offers a good explanation of the nature of Wilson's training as a diplomatist. He stresses Wilson's exclusively theoretical preparation in the field of foreign affairs. In identifying the foundation of the President's political thinking Link cites the religious and ethical beliefs and values that he inherited from the Christian tradition and from his own Presbyterian theology.

In another of his books, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917, Link criticizes Wilson's

"missionary diplomacy" in trying to shape the Mexican Revolution into a pattern of his own making. He makes reference to several of the President's important Mexican speeches and also explains Villa's reason for expecting backing from the United States. Mr. Link is strong in his praise of Carranza's determination and is critical of Wilson.¹²

An almost cubistic view of Wilson's decisionmaking process can be found in The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson, a collection of essays edited by Earl Latham. Historians, economists, political scientists and jurists have combined their talents to examine such topics as Wilson's relationship with his cabinet, his temperament, his extreme sense of morality and his self-righteousness. The President's distrust of many would-be advisers is an important subject which this book brings to light.¹³

President Wilson was also little disposed to accept the advice of his chief military assistants. In his autobiography, Some Memories of a Soldier, Major General Hugh Lenox Scott provides another perspective of Wilson's decisionmaking as he relates his bewilderment over the President's decisions concerning Mexico. Scott had confidence in Villa. He even had intentions of someday inviting Villa to attend the Army's school at Fort Leavenworth, "where he might learn the rudiments of morals."¹⁴ Scott urged Wilson not to recognize Carranza and he never understood the President's reasons for doing so.¹⁵ Scott later opposed the decision to allow

Carranza's troop to cross American soil to surprise Villa at Agua Prieta. Secretary of War Newton Baker's lack of preparation for the crisis provoked by the Columbus raid is one of the subjects discussed in C. H. Cramer's Newton D. Baker, A Biography. Baker was appreciative of Scott, his first military mentor, and respected his rugged common sense. Cramer indicates that Baker's real admiration was reserved for Tasker Howard Bliss, Scott's assistant.¹⁶

Bliss had commanded the troops responsible for the Mexican border earlier in his career and he was keenly aware of the importance of avoiding a war with Mexico. The important role played by Bliss as an advisor to Baker, a pacifist, throughout the period of the Mexican crisis is explained in Frederick Palmer's, Bliss, Peacemaker. In a chapter titled "Keeping Peace on the Border," Palmer shows in detail Bliss's deep understanding of the complexities of the Mexican problem and of the difficulties inherent in the conduct of a "punitive" operation.

President Wilson's reasons for deciding to send a punitive expedition to Mexico in response to the Columbus raid is explained in detail in an unpublished PhD dissertation written by Robert Bruce Johnson titled The Punitive Expedition. According to Johnson the most important reason why Wilson decided to take military action was American public opinion. The combined arguments of the interventionists, those who demanded increased preparedness, and a multitude of other groups joined the average citizen in a cry to avenge the national honor.

OPERATIONS IN MEXICO

Although the Punitive Expedition has never been given a balanced and thorough treatment many words have been written about it. Often the campaign is referred to casually, as in passing, as an anecdote in the brilliant career of General Pershing. In fact, General Pershing who wrote two volumes about his experiences in the World War has written a scant few pages, aside from official reports, about his conduct of the Expedition. However, several worthwhile references are available which suggest that many untold stories remain hidden within existing accounts.

A careful reading of the literature on the subject indicates that Pershing perhaps never understood the broader implications of his mission as far as the importance of keeping peace with Mexico is concerned. He was concerned with developments in Europe but he had trouble understanding the realities of the Mexican situation. The experience taxed Pershing's patience and was a source of extreme frustration and disappointment for him. His ability to inspire the confidence if not the affection of his men and to subordinate his own will to that of his civilian superiors during this period marked Pershing as a military man of great potential value to his country.

John J. Pershing-General of the Armies by Frederick Palmer is probably the best biography yet written of the soldier and the man. It includes accounts of a few innocuous

aspects of the Expedition such as the General's close relationship with one of his aides, Lieutenant James L. Collins. The diary of Lieutenant Collins is in the possession of his son, Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., the present Chief of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. In general, Palmer is quite sympathetic toward Pershing whom he shows to be laboring under too many restrictions in Mexico. A candid and far more human picture of Pershing is found in Blumenson's Patton Papers, Volume I. Pershing is shown to be an incessant trainer of troops and a strict disciplinarian who emphasized meticulous attention to detail. Much has been written about Pershing's loyalty to civil authority but in few places are his feelings better shown than in a letter he wrote to Patton during the campaign.¹⁷ Blumenson's book is filled with interesting descriptions of many subjects to include everyday camp life, rigorous "progressive training" programs and operations in pursuit of Villa.

In Pershing's Mission in Mexico Haldeen Braddy suggests that Pershing did not have sufficient respect for his adversary and the latter's importance to Mexico.¹⁸ Braddy's book is a product of careful research and it contains accurate though brief coverage of the highlights of the entire campaign.¹⁹ Donald Smythe's Guerrilla Warrior describes the early life of General Pershing and includes a careful, critical examination of the Expedition. Smythe doubts that Pershing ever understood why the Mexican people resented his presence

and reacted toward him and his men as they did. Smythe asks, as did many Mexicans in 1916, why a force in pursuit of a swift moving, mounted guerrilla contained so many foot infantry troopers and artillery pieces. The author's explanations of the Parral and Carrizal incidents are among the best published. They are both interesting and convincing and they are void of dramatic exaggeration.²⁰ Another important contribution of this work is the information concerning the influence of Funston upon Pershing's actions. It appears that Funston was convinced of the need to eventually fight the Mexicans. His aggressiveness may have encouraged Pershing to be more bold and haughty than it was prudent for him to have been. Smythe's bibliography on Pershing's early life is extensive.

Palmer, in his biography of Bliss indicates that Funston may have been over eager to fight the Mexicans as a result of his own frustrating experience as commander of the occupation forces at Vera Cruz. Funston was anxious for some activity just a few days prior to the tragic incident at Carrizal.²¹ Two weeks after that action Bliss prepared a telegram to Funston in which he clearly spelled out the administration's policy.

A brilliant description of the terrain in the area of operations, some good maps and analysis of the major problems encountered are all to be found in Colonel H. A. Toulmin's, With Pershing in Mexico. Especially good are the author's appraisals of the use of aviation and motorized

truck convoys to support the operation. Pershing's use of trucks is addressed in a research project written in 1974 by Captain John C. Speedy, then a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The project is titled, "Cactus and Carburetors: The Development of Motor Vehicle Maintenance Systems by the U.S. Army during the Punitive Expedition 1916-1917." Captain Speedy's report also contains an excellent annotated bibliography. The activities of the 1st Aero Squadron are discussed in From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, the memoirs of Major General Benjamin D. Foulois. Foulois commanded Pershing's eight aeroplane force. He credits the aviators with having had a great degree of success in their scouting operations during the brief period when the planes were flyable.

The most detailed and carefully written, published account of the military aspects of the Expedition is Chasing Villa by Colonel Frank Tompkins. Tompkins who was involved in the action at Parral was frustrated throughout the campaign and appears to have cared ^{little} for the diplomatic implications of his and Pershing's missions. Tompkins points out an important misunderstanding which hampered operations from the moment General Pershing received word that the de facto government troops at Palomas would oppose his entry into Mexico until the Expedition was withdrawn. The misunderstanding centered around the conditions under which Pershing's men entered Mexico. While Mexicans were denouncing the intervention almost

unanimously, the Americans were receiving assurances from Washington that they would be welcomed by the de facto government.²² The report of the Parral action by Tompkins is important and his observations of the entire campaign are filled with useful information. In an appendix he discusses cavalry lessons of the Expedition while other appendices concern aviation, motor transport and personnel.

Another participant, George Brydges Rodney sheds light on the battle of Carrizal in As a Cavalryman Remembers. The tragedy there which brought the United States and Mexico closer to war than at any other time during the campaign has usually been blamed on either Mexican treachery or Captain Boyd's obstinance. Rodney suggests that Boyd had secret orders known only to him and Pershing. In defense of Boyd, Rodney quotes Boyd's squadron commander at the time of the action as having referred to Boyd as the most diplomatic captain in his squadron.²³ Rodney's criticisms of the quality of the training conducted by the troopers involved in the Expedition ring truer than descriptions written by Lieutenant George Patton for publication in praise of his commander. Rodney also discusses supply problems such as receiving no clothing for six months and patching trousers with shelter tents.

General Pershing's Report of the Punitive Expedition written at Colonia Dublan is the best official record of the early months of the campaign. At least two-thirds of the

report consists of administrative annexes and appendices. Of particular interest are Pershing's accounts of the handling of the Palomas incident and of the actions at Parral and Carrizal. In the first case Pershing indicated that it was his intention to cross into Mexico even if it meant fighting the Mexican troops at Palomas. In describing the attack at Parral Pershing accused the Mexicans of an unprovoked and outrageous attack. Pershing also blamed the Mexican forces for committing a deliberate act of war at Carrizal when the circumstances warranted a clearer explanation. The facts known by Pershing at the time the report was written clearly indicated the responsibility of the Americans for what happened there.

Raymond J. Reed in an unpublished masters thesis titled The Mormons in Chihuahua draws on an excellent eye witness account of the Carrizal battle as told by Lemuel Spilsbury, a Mormon guide who accompanied Boyd. Reed's work also includes interesting glimpses of camp life at Colonia Dublan and social commentary concerning Negro soldiers not contained in other works.

Clarence Clendenon's Blood on the Border contains a scholarly treatment of the border problem from its earliest beginnings. Much of the information concerning the activities of Pershing's forces is contained in the author's The United States and Pancho Villa written eight years earlier. The last chapter of the book is devoted to border troubles which took

place after the departure of the Punitive Expedition, the last occurring in 1930.

A final and important source of information on this period is Gustavo Casasola's Historia Grafica de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1900-1970. This work which was prepared in ten volumes is a photographic history of the Mexican Revolution. The narration which accompanies the photographs is not always historically exact but it probably reflects the understanding which most educated Mexicans have of their history. The entire ten volume set was offered inexpensively to the people of Mexico in a promotional arrangement with one of that country's largest department store chains. Volume IV is devoted to the Carranza years. It explains the perspective of Mexicans during this period.

Despite any feelings that Americans had to the contrary, the de facto government forces clearly wanted to put an end to Pancho Villa. He was their enemy and once he recovered from his wounds he seriously challenged their authority in Chihuahua. On 15 September 1916 he took the city of Chihuahua and for several months thereafter he enjoyed many military successes. Throughout the volume the American forces are referred to as the "invasores." Also, new interpretations are presented in the discussion of critical events such as the Parral and Carrizal incidents. This suggests that a careful search of Mexican archival material may someday shed new light on these issues.

RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION

The Expedition had many salubrious effects upon the army and upon the general state of the country's preparedness for war. Much training was accomplished both in the United States and Mexico. The National Guard which was to play an important role in the Great War was given an opportunity to organize and test its muscles on this side of the Atlantic. General Pershing in his autobiography, My Experiences in the World War, places particular emphasis upon the training that his men received in the "war of movement" while in Mexico. He also gives his opinion of the overall accomplishments of the campaign. His account contains some curious errors of fact which may be oversights or which may reveal a hidden side of Pershing's character.²⁴

In his biography of Secretary of War Baker, Clarence Cramer makes it clear that both President Wilson and Baker were well pleased with Pershing's performance in Mexico. In fact, Pershing's complete subordination to his civilian bosses was an important factor in the decision to give him the command of the American Expeditionary Force. His loyalty was contrasted with the highly political conduct of Leonard Wood who was also under consideration for that job.²⁵ Further discussion of this subject, to include Baker's statement that the Wilson administration did not really want Pershing to capture Villa can be found in the last chapter of Smythe's book Guerrilla Warrior.²⁶

ENDNOTES

¹The Guggenheims and Huntingtons along with such men as John D. Rockefeller, Nelson Aldrich and William Randolph Hearst were among those who were attracted to Mexico by Diaz's policy of encouraging foreign investment. Later such men had a dedicated spokesman for their interests in U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson. p. 529.

²J. Fred Rippy, "The United States and Mexico," Mexico, American Policies Abroad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 40.

³According to Rippy, "The Revolution which overthrew Diaz was in large measure prepared and organized within the United States, and the subsequent failure of Madero was partially due to the favoritism of the United States in the matter of arms and munitions shipments, the lack of confidence implied and engendered by Taft's warning to Americans to withdraw, and the menacing hostility of Henry Lane Wilson. It may well be that the Diaz regime would have been demolished even if American neutrality had been more strictly observed. In the same way it seems likely that the impractical Madero would have met his fate sooner or later had the attitude of Taft been less friendly at the beginning and the conduct of Henry Lane Wilson less embarrassing at the end." p. 39.

⁴Of particular interest are the discussions of the President's problems in dealing with Theodore Roosevelt, the outstanding spokesman of those who demanded immediate and extensive military preparation, and the difficulties arising from conflicts within his own government. General Leonard Wood, the Army Chief of Staff, two members of Wilson's cabinet, Secretaries Lindley Garrison and David Houston, and close personal advisor, Colonel E. M. House, all insisted upon the need for increased preparedness. The President refused to be swayed fearing the development of a large standing army and accepting a powerful navy with a strengthened nation guard as a more legitimate means of defense.

⁵Zach E. Cobb, a Collector of Customs at El Paso waged a personal war against Villa with the sole objective of bringing about Villa's downfall. His messages to the Department of State did great damage to Villa's cause as did his

efforts to cut off Villa's supply of American coal and his revenue from exports to the United States.

⁶In a letter to his wife dated 30 October 1915, Patton wrote "This is the greatest side show you ever saw. Yesterday a circus came through followed during the afternoon by two trains of Mexicans. The first train had the damndest bunch of ancient carriages on it you ever dreamed of. About half of the Mexican troops are, in the words of McCauley, 'ancient men on crutches and women great with child.'" p. 303. The Mexicans described by Patton were members of the Carrancista force enroute to reinforce Agua Prieta.

⁷William Randolph Hearst was one such advocate identified by Fain. He quotes an article in Hearst's New York Evening Journal which stated, "California and Texas were part of Mexico once . . . what has been done in California and Texas by the United States can be done all the way down to the southern bank of the Panama Canal and a few miles beyond." p. 34.

⁸In an interview with Baker in May of 1916 the President explained his Mexican policy which he said, "was based upon two of the most deeply seated convictions of his life. First, his shame as an American over the first Mexican war, and his resolution that there should never be another such predatory enterprise. Second, upon his belief in the principle laid down in the Virginia Bill of Rights, that a people has the right 'to do what they damn please with their own affairs' (He used the word damn)" p. 74.

⁹Baker, op. cit., p. 74.

¹⁰"Having before him two personalistic factions, he had to judge them through the personality of the chiefs and Carranza with all his faults was infinitely superior as a statesman to the wild-tempered Villa. . . . What we did criticize was that recognition was granted not because Carranza was right, but because Carranza had more soldiers in the field . . . Was not this manner of acting a plain denial of Mr. Wilson's moral attitude? p. 126.

¹¹"The best evidence that this solution did not seem impractical, even in Washington, is found in the fact that Mr. Wilson went as far as to suggest it in one of his notes. But it happened that exactly at the time when the warring factions and the patriotic Mexicans were getting ready to bring such a meeting for the organization of a constitutional

government suddenly our people learned that General Carranza had been recognized as the government of Mexico." p. 127.

¹²Mr. Link credits Carranza with preserving the integrity and independence of the Revolution and thus freeing Mexico to pursue her own destiny. Wilson's interference damaged Mexican-American relations greatly but he is praised for denying Huerta and for refusing to go to war with Mexico.

¹³Because of press leaks during this period, the President is reported to have virtually stopped discussing important questions at cabinet meetings, p. 17. Furthermore, he was distrustful of State Department and Foreign Service Officers because they were, "either aristocrats, the products of exclusive schools and a snobbish society or else sycophantic imitators of the wealthy class, p. 161. Wilson, intuitive and idealistic did not appreciate and distrusted Lansing's analytical realism, p. 180.

¹⁴Hugh L. Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York: The Century Co., 1929), p. 516.

¹⁵Scott relates, "I asked the officers of the State Department, junior to the Secretary, why such a thing had been done and they said they did not know, for they had all advised against it, a month previous to the recognition. That information has always made the President's step even more of a mystery to me." p. 517.

¹⁶On the day he was sworn in as Secretary of War, Baker was informed that "Hell has broken loose in Mexico." Villa had raided Columbus. Baker later recalled that he had at that time a vague notion that Mexico was south of the Rio Grande River and that he had no inkling as to the cause of the trouble down there. p. 83.

¹⁷In this letter Pershing wrote, "You must remember that when we enter the army we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward our government entirely regardless of our own views . . . we are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to do so or else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the complete understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions." p. 354.

¹⁸Braddy quotes a letter from Pershing to General Scott written in September of 1916 in which he stated that the removal of Villa from the scene would accomplish little or nothing. "Even though he were captured, some one else . . . would up and take his place locally." p. 65.

¹⁹Braddy attributes the killing of an important Villista Colonel, Cardenas, to Emil Holmdahl a member of Lieutenant Patton's detachment. Although Patton's official report correctly credited Holmdahl with the killing, Patton later sought an award for himself for the act. He also received much favorable coverage in the press for it.

²⁰Smythe shows that Captain Boyd, the American commander, was responsible for the Carrizal incident and that Pershing was made aware of that fact by reports from several sources. With regard to Parral, the participation of the mysterious Elisa Griensen is discussed.

²¹On 16 June 1916, five days prior to the Carrizal battle, Bliss wrote a memorandum which discussed Funston's message No. 1787. Funston indicated a desire "to capture something, some place, anything without any clearly expressed idea as to what the ultimate object is." p. 115.

²²Prior to entering Mexico Pershing received orders outlining his responsibilities and the attitude to be observed toward troops of the de facto government. Of this Tompkins says: "This confidential telegram shows very plainly that while, in the exchange of notes between the two governments relative to our sending troops into Mexico to punish Villa, we assumed the attitude that this expedition was in accord with a friendly agreement between the two countries, proposed in the first place by Mexico, and planned to be of mutual benefit, with the troops of Mexico cooperating with the troops of the United States in crushing a common enemy, the position was false, not founded on fact, and was in danger of being challenged by the troops of Mexico." p. 71.

²³George B. Rodney, As a Cavalryman Remembers (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1944), p. 275.

²⁴It may be that Pershing's failure to kill or capture Villa was a greater disappointment to him than most historians believe. In his autobiography Pershing credits his men with having wounded Villa. There is no doubt that Pershing knew that claim to be untrue. Either de facto

government troops which Pershing frequently criticized for their uncooperative attitude actually wounded Villa at Guerrero or he was accidentally wounded by one of his own men. p. 9.

²⁵ According to Cramer, both Baker and Wilson were confident that Pershing would remain loyal to civil authority and they were just as certain that Wood would not. p. 114.

²⁶ Smythe, op. cit., p. 266.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have identified what I believe to be the significant aspects of the Punitive Expedition and have prepared an interpretive guide to the study of this subject. My examination of available materials has uncovered numerous topics which deserve further investigation.

Some of the most important questions suggested by the materials dealing with the events of this period concern America's foreign policy formulation process. A careful examination of President Wilson's use of special agents as intelligence gathers seems appropriate. Likewise, the influence of private, moneyed interests upon politicians, advisers and decisionmakers involved in Mexican-American relations should be reevaluated. The widely accepted criticisms of Wilson's moral intervention may be unjust when considered in the light of new and previously overlooked information on the subject such as that included in the works by Hill and Stephenson.

President Wilson's ignorance of the Mexican psyche may have prevented him from ever understanding a fundamental issue: the almost universal rejection by Mexicans of any American tampering with their national sovereignty. The

charge by Vasconcelos that American meddling prolonged the Mexican Revolution at a critical juncture is thought provoking.

Another question deals with the military input to the decisionmaking process. Many times when handling matters with significant military implications Wilson wholly rejected or else ignored the recommendations of his top military advisers. To an extent this was probably a reflection of Wilson's self-assured egotism. Likewise, certain matters of a diplomatic nature may not have fallen under the purview of the Army chief of staff regardless of military ramifications. It may be, however, that military opinions were neither solicited nor respected at this time because of demonstrated incompetence in handling issues that were not exclusively military in nature. Was the leadership of the Army from the chief of staff down to the commander of the expeditionary force in Mexico unable to see beyond the immediate military aspects of the Mexican question?

Pershing's relationship with his aggressive and impatient commander Frederick Funston should be carefully studied. Prior to the Carrizal incident both Pershing and Funston showed signs of not understanding the administration's policy. Accounts of Captain Boyd's actions at Carrizal considered in view of Funston's desire to "capture something" suggest that the American provocation may have been part of a deliberate plan.

Little has been written about the working relationship that existed between the American and the de facto government forces. Most accounts tend to criticize the Mexican forces for their refusal to cooperate and for their lack of enthusiasm in pursuit of Villa. These accusations may show how little the principals of both armies understood each other. Although many American reports stress the value of the native guides, interpreters and scouts employed by American forces, their low incident of success indicates that they were ineffective.

Perhaps the most valuable lessons to be gained from the study of the Punitive Expedition concern General Pershing and the way he dealt with the manifold challenges confronting him. In spite of numerous obstacles and handicaps he maintained a high state of training and morale within his command and satisfied both his civilian and military superiors. More importantly he kept the United States out of a war with Mexico at a crucial time in the world's history.

Regardless of the mistakes that American and Mexicans may have made in their past dealings with each other the future is for the people of both countries to determine. A solid relationship of interdependence must be based upon cooperation and mutual respect. The answers to many of the questions posed by the Punitive Expedition should clarify the past which we share with Mexico and encourage the development of such respect. Similarly a keener appreciation of the

problems confronted by America's military leaders at home and in Mexico during this period should increase our understanding of the historical role of America's military institution within her democracy.

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